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Capital Markets Law Journal Advance Access originally published online on October 5, 2007
Capital Markets Law Journal 2007 2(4):345-369; doi:10.1093/cmlj/kmm028
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© The Author (2007). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The evolution of regulatory enforcement action in the UK capital markets: a case of ‘less is more’?

Iain MacNeil*
* Alexander Stone Professor of Commercial Law, University of Glasgow.

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.


Key points

  • Formal enforcement action is a relatively rare occurrence within the UK capital markets regulatory framework. This characteristic distinguishes the UK from the US, where there is a more intense focus on enforcement, both public and private.
  • Several features of the UK regulatory system contribute towards a low incidence of enforcement. Some of these features are embedded in the statutory framework, but the FSA has played a key role in the development of enforcement policy, while the continuing presence of self-regulation in the form of the Combined Code has also played a part.
  • The focus on risk-based regulation in the UK has been a major influence for enforcement policy. The move to more principles-based regulation has also been a factor but one that is more difficult to interpret. If it is correct to assume that principles-based regulation does not affect the intensity of regulation, then the effect on the . . . [Full Text of this Article]

 

   1. Introduction
 

   2. Risk-based regulation
 

   3. Principles-based regulation
 
The move towards more principles-based regulation
The enforcement implications of principles-based regulation

   4. Self-regulation and market discipline
 

   5. The allocation of responsibility for regulatory contraventions
 

   6. Public and private enforcement
 
Public enforcement
Private enforcement

   7. Settlement and sanctions
 
Sanctions: the statutory options
Settlements: process and incentives
Procedural complications

   8. Synthesis and speculation
 

   9. Conclusions
 

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