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Capital Markets Law Journal Advance Access originally published online on June 17, 2009
Capital Markets Law Journal 2009 4(3):323-340; doi:10.1093/cmlj/kmp012
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The MAD disclosure regime and the twofold notion of inside information: the available solution

Jesper Lau Hansen and David Moalem*
* Jesper Lau Hansen, Dr Jur. and LL.M., Prof of Financial Market Law, Head of FOCOFIMA at the University of Copenhagen Law Faculty, Denmark. David Moalem, PhD and Attorney-at-law, Partner and Head of Capital Markets Group at Deloitte in Copenhagen, Denmark. The article is based on opinions filed with the CESR in response to its public hearing on the application of the MAD disclosure regime to rumours, see (n 13).

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.


Key points

  • In a recent consultation, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) proposed that an issuer should be obliged to disclose inside information in its possession if that information circulates as a market rumour.
  • It is argued that such an obligation will only arise in certain situations.
  • An interpretation of the disclosure regime in the EU Market Abuse Directive is offered which supports this argument, while solving what has been identified as the problem of the two-fold notion of inside information.

 


   1. Background
 
The Market Abuse Directive (MAD)1 was originally intended to be part of the Commission's 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)2 as a directive on market manipulation to supplement the 1989 Insider Dealing Directive.3 However, inspired by the British reform that led to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Directive, as adopted, presented a combined regulation of the broader issue of market abuse that covered:

  1. regulation of . . . [Full Text of this Article]


   2. The problem with rumours
 

   3. When should disclosure be made according to MAD Article 6(1)?
 

   4. The relationship between MAD Article 6(1) and MAD Articles 2–5
 

   5. The relationship between paras [1] and [6] of MAD Article 6
 

   6. The relationship between paras [1] and [3] of MAD Article 6
 

   7. What to do about leaks?
 

   8. Conclusions
 

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